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I. INTRODUCTION
One essential component of equal justice under the law is a neutral
and detached judge to preside over the court proceedings. Public con-
fidence in the legal system is maintained when a judge has no interest
in the parties, attorneys or subject matter of the litigation. Sua sponte
or by motion of a party, a federal judge is subject to disqualification for
conflicts of interest on both constitutional and statutory grounds.'
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the able assistance of Cheryl Gentry Cooper in the preparation of
this Article.
1. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-22 (1986)(quoting Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)), the Supreme Court held that, although the Con-
stitution does not reach every issue of judicial qualification, " 'it certainly violates
the [Due Process Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment . . . to subject [a per-
son's] liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a
direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
him in his case.'
The federal statute discussed in this Article establishes standards more de-
manding than the due process constitutional requirement. See United States v.
1046
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The statutory grounds for recusal,2 found at 28 U.S.C. § 455, are
Couch, 896 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1990)(collecting cases); In re IBM Corp., 618 F.2d
923, 932 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980)(holding that rejection of a claim under § 455 "aforti-
or defeats due process allegations").
2. The federal statutory provisions are similar to the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct
of the American Bar Association. See generally LEIEs W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2d ed.
1992).
The Judicial Conference of the United States adopted the Code with modifica-
tions approved April 6,1973 and March 6,1975. On December 5,1974, the Judicial
Disqualification Act, 88 Stat. 1609 was enacted and codified as 28 U.S.C. § 455. In
pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988), currently provides:
(a) Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall dis-
qualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding,
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in con-
troversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served dur-
ing such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or
such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such ca-
pacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particu-
lar case in controversy;,
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the sub-
ject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding,
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding,
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding,
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
The first disqualification statute in the United States was the Act of May 8,
1792, ch.36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278, which was amended by the Act of March 3, 1821, ch.
51, 3 Stat. 643. The statute was further amended by the Act of March 3, 1911, ch.
231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090, which provided:
Whenever it appears that the judge of any district court is in any way
concerned in interest in any suit pending therein, or has been of counsel
or is a material witness for either party, or is so related to or connected
with either party as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit
on the trial, it shall be his duty, on application by either party, to cause
the fact to be entered on the records of the court; ...
The 1911 statute was amended by the Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62 Stat.
908. Between 1948 and 1974, the federal statute provided no guidance on the
question of how to determine the substantiality of the judge's interest in a party.
The statute provided-
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
1993]
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divided into two parts. The first, § 455(a), is a waivable catch-all provi-
sion requiring disqualification "in any proceeding in which [the
judge's] impartiality might reasonably be questioned."3 The provision
"asks what a reasonable person knowing all the relevant facts would
think about the impartiality of the judge,"4 and "applies to the varied
and unpredictable situations not subject to reasonable legislative defi-
nition in which judges must act to protect the very appearance of
impartiality."s
case in which he has a substantial interest... or is so related to or con-
nected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his
opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal or other proceeding therein.
Acts of June 25, 1948, ch. 646. § 41, 62 Stat. 908.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)(1988). Section 455(a) is not a catchall provision encompassing
both the specifically enumerated grounds under subsection (b) as well as other
unspecified grounds. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 859 n.8 (1988). Circumstances which pose risks similar to, but outside the
language of the specific points of § 455(b) "may call for disqualification under
§ 455(a)." In re National Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1229 (7th Cir. 1988).
4. Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1980). In In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384
(7th Cir. 1990), Judge Easterbrook posed the dilemma of the objective standard in
§ 455(a):
An objective standard is essential when the question is how things ap-
pear to the well-informed, thoughtful observer rather than to a hyper-
sensitive or unduly suspicious person. Because some people see goblins
behind every tree, a subjective approach would approximate automatic
disqualification. A reasonable observer is unconcerned about trivial
risks; there is always some risk, a probability exceeding 0.0001%, that a
judge will disregard the merits. Trivial risks are endemic, and if they
were enough to require disqualification we would have a system of per-
emptory strikes and judge-shopping, which itself would imperil the per-
ceived ability of the judicial system to decide cases without regard to
persons. A thoughtful observer understands that putting disqualifica-
tion in the hands of a party, whose real fear may be that the judge will
apply rather than disregard the law, could introduce a bias into adjudica-
tion. Thus the search is for a risk substantially out of the ordinary.
An objective standard creates problems in implementation. Judges
must imagine how a reasonable, well-informed observer of the judicial
system would react. Yet the judge does not stand outside the system; as
a dispenser rather than a recipient or observer of decisions, the judge
understands how professional standards and the desire to preserve one's
reputation often enforce the obligation to administer justice impartially,
even when an observer might be suspicious. Judges asked to recuse
themselves hesitate to impugn their own standards; judges sitting in re-
view of others do not like to cast aspersions. Yet drawing all inferences
favorable to the honesty and care of the judge whose conduct has been
questioned could collapse the appearance of impropriety standard under
§ 455(a) into a demand for proof of actual impropriety. So although the
court tries to make an external reference to the reasonable person, it is
essential to hold in mind that these outside observers are less inclined to
credit judges' impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary itself
will be.
Id& at 386.
5. United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044
(1988). In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), the
1048
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The general language of § 455(a) is particularized but not dupli-
cated in § 455(b), which is not waivable 6 and which enumerates sev-
eral specific disqualification standards.7 While the § 455(a)
"appearance of partiality" standard is necessarily judgmental in na-
ture, the § 455(b) standards deal with ascertainable facts showing par-
tiality.8 Some courts regard § 455(b) as a list of "per se" circumstances
requiring recusal, i.e., "situations that may involve actual bias rather
than § 455(a)'s concern with the public perception of the judicial
process."9
... § 455(a) expands the protection of § 455(b), but duplicates some of its pro-
Supreme Court quoted the lower court's views about § 455(a). The Court of Ap-
peals stated:
'The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality.
If it would appear to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of
facts that would give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance
of partiality is created even though no actual partiality exists because the
judge does not recall the facts, because the judge actually has no interest
in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible. ....
Under section 455(a), therefore, recusal is required even when a judge
lacks actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or bias in the
case if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect
that the judge would have actual knowledge."
Id. at 860-61 (quoting Health Servs. Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796,
802 (5th Cir. 1986))(citations omitted).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e)(1988) states that a judge must not accept a waiver of any
ground for recusal under § 455(b). By contrast, the judge may accept such a
waiver of disqualification arising under § 455(a) "provided it is preceded by a full
disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification." See United States v.
Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745-46 (11th Cir. 1989)(expressing a preference for a waiver
where the judge determines the need for one without asking counsel for their
views).
7. See supra note 2.
8. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 499 F. Supp. 640, 641 (N.D. 11. 1980). The purpose of
specifying situations in § 455(b) "was to avoid any ambiguity inherent in"
§ 455(a). In re Letters Rogatory from Supreme Court, 661 F. Supp. 1168, 1173
(E.D. Mich. 1987).
Section 455(a) is broader than § 455(b)(1) in that it does not contain the term
"personal." However, cases applying § 455(a) also require that the nature of any
bias must be personal and not judicial. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, - U.S.
-(1994); United States v. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325,1348 (5th Cir. 1991), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 954 (1992). Both provisions require that the basis of the alleged bias or
prejudice emanate from an extrajudicial source, "not conduct which arises in a
judicial context." Apple v. Jewish Hosp. and Medical Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d
Cir. 1987).
9. Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527 (11th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490
U.S. 1066 (1989). See also In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 129
F.R.D. 409, 412 (D. P.R. 1989)("Section 455(b) leaves nothing to question. It is
meant to automatically exclude judges from situations that fall under the specific
provisions of the statute. In that sense, Section 455(b) is meant to supplement
Section 455(a) by detailing situations that Congress considers to be tantamount to
actual bias."); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir.
1987), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989) ("Section 455(b) covers situations in which
an actual conflict of interest exists, even if there is no appearance of one.").
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tection as well.... Within the area of overlap, it is unreasonable to interpret
§ 455(a) (unless the language requires it) as implicitly eliminating a limitation
explicitly set forth in § 455(b). It would obviously be wrong, for example, to
hold that "impartiality could reasonably be questioned" simply because one of
the parties is in the fourth degree of relationship to the judge.10
Despite legislative efforts to specify the disqualifying circum-
stances in § 455(b), courts repeatedly must define its scope and mean-
ing. This Article focuses on those specific bases for recusal.ll
Specifically, it discusses the issues of statutory interpretation found in
the case law applying § 455(b). In addition, it offers proposed amend-
ments to the current statutory language and suggests the addition of
another specific ground for judicial recusal under § 455(b).
In sum, this Article argues that periodically, it may be appropriate
to reexamine the statute for the purpose of (1) adding ethical duties
not currently described such as a duty to disclose disqualifying circum-
stances; (2) broadening preexisting duties such as the judge's duty to
inform himself or herself about financial holdings; or (3) adding new
disqualifying conditions such as recusals involving former law clerks.
Central to this last topic is concern about how legislators should de-
cide when judicial experience with a possible disqualifying context
justifies reclassifying a § 455(a) "appearance of partiality" situation as
a § 455(b) "per se" basis for recusal. If, in every questionable instance
of a given form of judicial behavior, average persons would feel un-
comfortable having their case presided over by a judge whose bias, re-
lationship or interest produces an appearance of partiality, serious
10. Liteky v. United States, - U.S. - (1994) (emphasis in original). The Court went
on to say: "Section 455(b)(5), which addresses the matter of relationship specifi-
cally, ends the disability at the third degree of relationship, and that should obvi-
ously govern for purposes of § 455(a) as well." Id.
Since subsection (a) deals with the objective appearance of partiality, any
limitations contained in (b) that consist of a subjective-knowledge re-
quirement are obviously inapplicable. Subsection (a) also goes beyond
(b) in another important respect: It covers all aspects of partiality, and
not merely those specifically addressed in subsection (b). However,
when one of those aspects addressed in (b) is at issue, it is poor statutory
construction to interpret (a) as nullifying the limitations (b) provides,
except to the extent the text requires.
Id. at n.2.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) is another federal recusal statute dealing generally with
allegations of personal bias and prejudice. It requires a party seeking a judge's
recusal to file a timely affidavit alleging bias.
When faced with a motion under § 144, the court focuses on the movant's
affidavit. The judge must pass on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit,
but not on the truth of the matters alleged. An affidavit is sufficient if it
alleges facts that, if true, would convince a reasonable person that bias
exists.
Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982)(cita-
tions omitted), cert denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983).
1050 [Vol. 72:1046
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thought should be given to placing those circumstances on the list of
disqualifying conditions in § 455(b).
II. SPECIFIC STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
A. Personal Bias or Prejudice
Of the disqualifying factors specified in § 455(b), personal bias or
prejudice is probably the most difficult to measure.12 In part, the diffi-
culty in applying the personal bias standard results from its subjectiv-
ity. Section 455(a)'s objective measurement depends upon an
assessment of how a reasonable person would respond to the judicial
conduct. By contrast, recusal for personal bias under § 455(b) requires
that a judge exhibit conduct which reveals an actual personal attitude
of bias or prejudice toward a party. Here, recusal is necessary not be-
cause the conduct appears biased but because the judge is biased to-
ward a party.13
In explaining the nature of personal bias or prejudice, the courts
have been more articulate in defining the type of bias to which the
statute does not apply than in defining the conduct that is covered by
this section. As a general matter, however, the courts have held that
recusal is necessary when bias or prejudice toward a party' 4 stems
from an extrajudicial source and results in an opinion on some basis
other than what the judge learned from participating in the case.15
12. See ABRAMSON, supra note 2, at 23 ("A familial relationship or financial interest
can be identified immediately and articulated in a recusal motion. Bias is neces-
sarily more elusive, because it focuses on the judge's personal thoughts.").
13. If a judge's conduct suggests a personal bias, there is also an appearance of parti-
ality, but the converse does not necessarily follow. The appearance of partiality
does not indicate that the judge has a personal bias. Despite the assertion that
the two sections are substantively "quite similar, if not identical," Chitimacha
Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 814 (1983), the nature of the inquiry is distinct. In re Barry, 946 F.2d 913, 914
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
14. To be disqualifying, the bias or prejudice must be personal. Some ill will or fa-
voritism must be directed toward a party as opposed to an attitude toward the
subject matter of the proceedings.
Each judge brings to the bench a background with neighbors, friends and
acquaintances, and business and social relations. The results of these as-
sociations and the impressions they create in the judge's mind form a
personality and philosophical disposition toward the world.... In short,
a judge is expected to act according to his values. Indeed, proof that a
judge's mind is a complete tabula rasa demonstrates lack of qualifica-
tion, not lack of bias.
ABRAMSON, supra note 2, at 24.
15. United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). The Supreme Court recently
stated that neither the presence nor the absence of an extrajudicial source deter-
mined the outcome of a challenge for bias. Justice Scalia went on to describe the
content of what he termed the extrajudicial source factor.
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Requiring litigants to establish an extrajudicial source for the bias they
allege makes a great deal of sense. After all, nearly every decision a judge
makes is partisan in the sense that it is more favorable to one side than the
other. Indeed, the judicial system is predicated upon the requirement that
judges and juries draw conclusions about facts and behavior presented to them
in the context of the judicial process. Moreover, litigation frequently unveils
unsavory facts about individuals and cases. Were disqualification to result
merely because uncomplimentary facts were learned in the course of litigation
or because conclusions were ultimately reached based on those facts the law of
recusal would surely cause the judicial system to grind to a halt.
Fortunately the law of recusal is not so inimical to dispute resolution. A
judge does not create questions of partiality merely by exercising his
judgment.1 6
When the bias or prejudice has no extrajudicial source, allegations of
bias or prejudice do not require recusal unless the judge's conduct
demonstrates pervasive bias against a party.17
The extrajudicial source rule is relevant to all categories of cases
relating to allegations of personal bias or prejudice, which include: (1)
judicial comments in court or to third parties;' 8 (2) judicial familiarity
with the proceedings;19 (3) the judge as an "adversary" of a party;2 0
and (4) bias for or against a party's attorney.2 1
1. Comments in Court or to Third Parties
Comments made by judges in court, in chambers or to the press or
other organizations may suggest that the judge has prejudged a case. 2 2
[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion. * * * [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of
facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceed-
ings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partial-
ity motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible.
Liteky v. United States, - U.S. - (1994) (citation omitted) (extrajudicial source
factor applies to § 455(a) cases as well as § 455(b) cases). The test produced a
four-justice concurrence, which criticized the "impossibility of fair judgment"
standard as being "difficult to distinguish from a per se extrajudicial source rule,
the very result the Court professes to reject." 1d. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16. Spangler v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 759 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
17. See Wiley v. Wainwright, 793 F.2d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1986); Ouachita Nat'l Bank
v. Tosco Corp., 686 F.2d 1291, 1300 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part on rehearing en
banc, 716 F.2d 485 (1983); Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1979);
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 22-27.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 28-33.
20. See infra text accompanying note 34.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
22. See, e.g., United States v. MMR Corp., 954 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1992)(finding
no personal bias where judge's comments at sentencing were based on evidence
heard during case); In re Barry, 946 F.2d 913, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1991)(finding no per-
sonal bias where judge gave law school speech in which he discussed the merits of
the case while it was still on appeal); Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928
1052 [Vol. 72:1046
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
Though an adversely affected party probably believes that a judge who
makes an adverse ruling or comment is partial to the other side, no
disqualifying personal bias occurs provided the judge is willing to con-
sider all the parties' evidence or arguments.23 Nonetheless, judicial
use of racial or religious epithets may imply that the judge is making
decisions based on irrational considerations and is biased toward a
party.24 Similarly, intemperate remarks, such as proclaiming the guilt
of a criminal defendant prior to the conclusion of the case, also may
show inappropriate bias.25
Judicial disqualification for public comments about pending pro-
ceedings depends on the application of the extrajudicial source rule
and the substance of the comments. In In re Barry,26 for example, a
trial judge gave a law school speech in which he discussed the defend-
ant's character and the merits of a highly publicized case while it was
still on appeal. When the case was subsequently remanded to the trial
judge for resentencing, the judge denied a motion for recusal. The
appellate court upheld the trial judge's denial of the motion on the
basis that the remarks were not extrajudicial. Although the remarks
were made outside of the courtroom, "[a] judge's candid reflections of
what he has inferred from the trial about the defendant's character
and conduct simply do not establish bias or prejudice."27
F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no personal bias where judge at pretrial con-
ference stated that he had seen better cases and where judge was gruff with both
counsel at trial); In re M. Ibrahim Kahn, P.S.C., 751 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1984)(find-
ing no personal bias where the court commented about a party's bad faith in its
opinion).
23. In United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (3rd Cir. 1973), the judge announced a
sentencing policy of a minimum prison term regarding all persons convicted of
violating selective service laws, even though there was no mandatory minimum
sentence provided by statute for those offenses. Here, the Third Circuit found an
impermissible, personal bias by the judge because of his predilection against a
class of persons who had violated the selective service laws. Id. at 529. By con-
trast, a generally tough sentencing policy by a judge does not necessarily show
personal bias. United States v. Richards, 737 F.2d 1307, 1310-11 (4th Cir. 1984),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). See also United States v. M1VIR Corp., 954 F.2d
1040,1044-45 (5th Cir. 1992)(finding no personal bias where the judge's comments
at sentencing were based on evidence heard during the case).
24. See, e.g., Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1020-21 (5th Cir.
1981)(holding that certain past racial comments were insufficient to justify
recusal), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
25. See United States v. Sutherland, 463 F.2d 641, 650 (5th Cir.)(finding recusal un-
necessary when judge could give fair and impartial trial), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1078 (1972).
26. 946 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
27. Id. at 914. The court reached its conclusion by combining the standards of
§§ 455(a) and (b)(1), finding that the judge's conduct did "not necessarily create
an appearance of personal bias or partiality such as to require recusal under 28
U.S.C. § 455." Id.
Of course, the substance of the remarks is important. General statements
about the wisdom of applying particular laws probably do not show prejudgment
1993] 1053
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2. Familiarity with Proceedings
Judicial familiarity with the proceedings generally results in a sim-
ple application of the extrajudicial source rule. The charge of bias
often results from (1) a judge's review of his or her own prior decision;
(2) adverse rulings against the moving party 8 or (3) encounters with
the moving party in an earlier, unrelated case. 29 The gist of such a
claim is that the judge's background with the issues or parties may
impair the judge's ability to hear both sides with an open mind.30
However, the general rule is that a "judge's mere familiarity with a
party and his legal difficulties through prior judicial hearings does not
automatically or inferentially raise the issue of bias."31 If adverse rul-
ings were sufficient to prove bias, judges would have to step aside any-
time they disagreed with a party's counsel.3 2 Even in contempt
proceedings, when the allegedly contemptuous behavior was directed
at or witnessed by the judge, recusal is not automatic. However, offen-
sive behavior which enrages the judge does call for recusal.33
3. Judge as "Adversary" of Party
At some time during a proceeding, a party may, for a variety of
of a pending case. By contrast, declarations that certain claims should never be
successful or that all prosecutions should result in maximum sentences indicate
prejudgment of the matter.
28. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Department of Navy, 974 F.2d 1140, 1142-43 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that appellate judge's previous adverse ruling in refusing to dismiss
attorney's complaint against trial judge was made in an administrative capacity
and did not prevent the appellate judge from considering an appeal of the case
which attorney's client lost at the trial level).
29. See, e.g., Browning v. Foltz, 837 F.2d 276, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1988)(holding that
judge's denial of earlier habeas corpus petition by petitioner did not show per-
sonal bias requiring recusal as to a successive petition, even though the judge
commented in denying the first petition that petitioner may have committed the
crimes), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989); United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476,
1481 (10th Cir.)(holding that judge's knowledge obtained during trial of the case
did not constitute extrajudicial bias), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987); Allen-My-
land v. International Business Mach. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 491, 493-94 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)(finding that judge's conduct during prior cases involving a party did not
constitute personal bias). See also United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 335
(7th Cir.)(holding that a letter from the party's parent asking for mercy did not
make the judge partial), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); United States v. Hamil-
ton, 792 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1986)(holding that a defendant's prior appearance
before a federal judge who was then a state judge was not a reasonable basis to
question the judge's impartiality and did not show personal bias or prejudice).
30. ABRAMSON, supra note 2, at 31. While it may be difficult to prove personal bias
when a judge reviews his or her prior decisions, the appearance of partiality ex-
ists when a judge is asked, in effect, to "second-guess" the prior decision.
31. Nerison v. Solem, 715 F.2d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1026
(1984).
32. Hayes v. National Football League, 463 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
33. See Spruell v. Jarvis, 654 F.2d 1090, 1095 (5th Cir. 1981).
1054 [Vol. 72:1046
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reasons, view the judge as an adversary and look for some reason to
have a different judge decide the case. One tactic used by dissatisfied
litigants is to threaten the judge or to sue the judge in a collateral
lawsuit for a civil rights or similar violation. Suing or threatening all
federal judges, or reporting a judge to the appropriate judicial discipli-
nary tribunal fails to establish personal bias on the part of the judge.34
4. Bias Toward Counsel
Section 455(b)(1) requires recusal when the judge has a personal
bias or prejudice toward a party. Courts rarely find that animosity or
affability between a judge and an attorney requires judicial disqualifi-
cation under this statutory section.35 Typically, the alleged bias de-
rives from the performance of judicial duties in the instant or an
unrelated proceeding and, therefore, does not result from an extraju-
dicial source.
[I]t is not at all unusual, given the combative nature of litigation for a judge to
have an attorney before him with whom the judge has had prior acerbic rela-
tions. It is one of the earliest and most fundamental lessons of judging that a
judge must rule on the merits without regard to the personality of the attor-
ney or any unpleasant experiences the judge may have had with the attorney
34. See United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1976)(holding that
filing suit against all judges to halt the case at bar does not indicate judicial parti-
ality), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977). See also Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp.,
899 F.2d 1350, 1355-56 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding no partiality when a party's spouse's
filed a complaint against the judge with the Judicial Inquiry Board); United
States v. Eisenberg, 734 F. Supp. 1137,1167 (D.N.J. 1990)(holding that the defend-
ant's criticism of the judge's handling of the codefendant's case did not create an
appearance of partiality); United States v. Mattison, 731 F. Supp. 831, 832 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990) (threatening all federal judges does not require recusal; "a rule which
would disqualify everybody must be held to disqualify nobody").
Another basis for recusal motions based on personal bias relates to the judge's
extrajudicial familiarity with a party. With federal judges, the issue arises infre-
quently for two reasons. First, a judge from a small town may have a standing
order that he or she will not sit in a case involving a party from his or her
hometown. Second, with far fewer federal cases than state cases coming from the
same geographic area, the incidence of a friend's case coming before the judge is
relatively remote. Moreover, fellow judges can hear the cases involving the
judge's long-time friends. Courts appear to exhibit less tolerance for this type of
alleged favoritism. The basis for recusal is likely to be grounded more in the
appearance of partiality than it is in any proof of personal bias. For example, in
Spires v. Hearst Corp., 420 F. Supp. 304 (C.D. Cal. 1976), the appearance of parti-
ality led a judge to disqualify himself when a complimentary news article was
written by a reporter for a party in a case before the judge.
35. Instead, recusal is sought through application of the § 455(a) appearance of parti-
ality standard. See, e.g., In re Allied Signal, Inc., 891 F.2d 974, 976 (1st Cir.
1989) (finding that a series of social and business relationships between the judge
and counsel for a party before the judge's appointment to the bench did not cast
significant doubt on the judge's impartiality under § 455(a)).
Bias solely against an attorney may also offend due process. See, e.g., United
States v. Singer, 710 F.2d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1983).
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in the past.3 6
Generally, a party need not fear that clashes between judge and attor-
ney will color the court's perception of the party. "If anything, a
court's impatience with counsel is often charged with the realization
that the client is not getting what the client paid for."37 However,
recusal may be appropriate if it can be shown that the judge's extraju-
dicial bias or prejudice toward the attorney can be imputed to the at-
torney's client,38 or if the attorney and party share a characteristic,
such as race or ethnic background, and the bias is based on that shared
characteristic.39
It is tempting simply to add the aforementioned personal bias cate-
gories to § 455(b)(1) as specific but not exclusive examples of personal
bias. While it would be possible to amend the federal statute to state
precise types of bias and thereby avoid reliance on the judiciary, such
36. United States v. Helmsley, 760 F. Supp. 338, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 963 F.2d
1522 (2d Cir. 1992).
37. Spangler v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 759 F. Supp. 1327, 1335 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 656 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988)(finding that
recusal may be warranted if the prejudice against the attorney is so virulent as to
amount to bias against the party); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 830 (4th Cir.
1987) (holding that alleged bias against an attorney must actually cause bias to the
party).
See Diversified Numismatics, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 949 F.2d 382, 385 (11th
Cir. 1991)(holding that prior recusals by the judge in cases in which counsel was
involved did not show bias toward counsel in the instant case); Gilbert v. City of
Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1398-99 (8th Cir. 1983)(also finding no bias where the
judge had recused himself in previous cases involving counsel), cert denied, 466
U.S. 972 (1984).
Cf. Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 634-35 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(finding no per-
sonal bias where a special master's private practice included an administrative
appeal in which he was opposed by the same law firm appearing on behalf of
party in the case over which he was presiding as special master); In re Snowshoe
Co., 137 B.R. 619, 621-22 (N.D. W. Va.)("[A] judge's bias in favor of an attorney
need not affect the judge's ability to decide cases fairly where that attorney repre-
sents one of the parties to the action but is not otherwise an interested party."),
affd, 953 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1991).
See also In re Continental Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259, 1261-63 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that the judge's acceptance of a job with a law firm involved in the
case shortly after issuing important orders created an appearance of partiality);
Panzardi-Alvarez v. United States, 879 F.2d 975, 984 (1st Cir. 1989)(suggesting
that extreme cases of judicial favoritism or hostility toward a party's attorney are
rare), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990).
39. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044,1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976).
Allegations of judicial bias toward counsel may also be based upon the judge's
employment of counsel. Generally, recusal is unnecessary if the judge's interest
in litigation was official rather than personal and the litigation has been con-
cluded. See, e.g., United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 505-06 (N.D. Cal.
1976)(finding that recusal was not warranted where the prosecutor represented
the judge in proceedings related to a motion to quash a subpoena because the
matter involved the judge's judicial conduct).
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amendments may omit unforeseen but important types of bias. In ad-
dition, the amendments would do no more than list a variety of exam-
ples of bias that are already well-known to the courts. Because of the
subjective nature of personal bias, a list of examples of bias seems to
be the most any statutory modification of § 455(b)(1) could
accomplish.
B. Relationships and Interests
1. Past Private Relationships
Section 455(b)(2) prohibits a judge from presiding over a matter in
controversy if he or she, while in private practice, was involved either
as (1) former counsel or as an associate of counsel in the matter, or (2)
a material witness in the matter.40 The focus of this prohibition is the
judge's association with a matter prior to becoming a judge.41 As the
result of a prior professional connection with a case, the judge may
40. 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(2)(1988). This subsection was amended in 1974 to substitute ob-
jective criteria for the former subjective approach whereby the opinion of the
judge was conclusive. Under the current section:
A judge is disqualified... when any one of four circumstances exist: 1.
When the judge in private practice served as a lawyer in the matter in
controversy;, 2. When a lawyer with whom the judge practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter in contro-
versy; 3. When the judge has been a material witness concerning the
matter in controversy; or 4. When the lawyer described in circumstance
(2) has been a material witness concerning the matter in controversy.
In re Norton, 119 B.R. 332, 338 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990). The Norton court con-
cluded that the nature of a bankruptcy proceeding did not require judicial recusal
from the entire case. Id at 340.
The 1990 amendments to the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Con-
duct, upon which the federal statute is largely based, deleted the phrase "or such
lawyer" from its text relating to material witnesses because "it created ambiguity
as to whether it referred to any lawyer with whom the judge had practiced law -
in which case the rule would be too broad, or to a lawyer serving on the matter
with whom the judge was associated - in which case the phrase would be redun-
dant." AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDuCT 18 (Discussion
Draft 1989).
41. Disqualification may be appropriate even if the judge was unaware of his or her
associates' earlier involvement in a matter. Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. Channel Fuel-
ing Service, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 150, 152 (E.D..Tex. 1987). See aZso E. & J. Gallo
Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 955 F.2d 1327,1342 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992)(finding a judge's
lack of actual knowledge his former law firm's involvement with the plaintiff to
be irrelevant if a person knowing all the facts could reasonably question the
judge's partiality)(citing Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988)),
amended and superseded as to other issues, 967 F.2d 1280 (1992).
A judge's mere former professional association with counsel appearing in the
case at bar does not satisfy the language of § 455(b)(2), or the § 455(a) appearande
of impropriety standard. See, e.g., Alvarado Morales v. Digital Equipment Corp.,
699 F. Supp. 16, 18 (D.P.R. 1988); Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 385 F. Supp. 711,
714 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Similarly, a judge's prior association with an attorney who is
a trustee for a party may not raise an appearance problem, especially when the
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have significant knowledge about the case. This standard is especially
significant for a new judge. Theoretically, the longer a judge is on the
bench, the less frequently the judge's prior professional relationships
will require disqualification.
Most of the case law construing § 455(b)(2) relates to interpreta-
tion of the phrase "matter in controversy." A judge is not forever dis-
qualified by the fact that the judge or someone with whom the judge
practiced represented a party on an unrelated matter in the past.42
Disqualification is necessary only if the judge or the judge's former
associate represented the party on the same matter.43
[S]ome matters that might otherwise be thought "unrelated" to the proceed-
ing are considered sufficiently related to require disqualification.... That
Congress chose to ground disqualification in section 455(b)(2) on a judge's re-
lation to service "concerning the matter" suggests that disqualification is re-
quired where the proceeding relates in any broad sense to the suspect matter,
even though such has not been made part of the current proceeding.4 4
Effective judicial application of the term "matter in controversy" is
necessary to address the valid concerns of § 455(b)(2). Suppose, for
example, that in private practice a judge had represented a police of-
ficer charged with the crime of seriously assaulting a victim. Follow-
ing an acquittal, the defense attorney became a judge, and the victim
sued civilly for injuries incurred during the assault. The civil case now
before the judge is neither the same "proceeding" as defined by stat-
ute4 5 nor the same "case" 4 6 as interpreted by the courts in other
trustee is not expected to testify and has no personal liability in the case. See Gray
v. University of Arkansas, 883 F.2d 1394, 1397-98 (8th Cir. 1989).
42. Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982)(hold-
ing that recusal was not required where the judge, while in private practice, rep-
resented a party on an unrelated matter), cert denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983). See
also United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the
judge's prior representation of the crime victim regarding unrelated matters was
not a basis for disqualification under § 455(a)); National Auto Brokers v. General
Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 958 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978)(reaching the same conclusion
under either the pre-1974 or post-1974 federal statute), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1072
(1979).
Courts use the § 455(a) appearance of partiality standard when the judge as an
attorney opposed an instant party in an unrelated case. United States v. Hurst,
951 F.2d 1490, 1503 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1952 (1992).
43. See, e.g., Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 555 F. Supp. 28, 32 (D.N.J. 1982)(finding no basis
for recusal when the judge's association with the attorneys who represented cli-
ents on matters related to the case at bar did not begin until approximately
twenty years after the earlier proceeding had concluded). See also Hampton v.
Hanrahan, 499 F. Supp. 640, 644-45 (N.D. Ill. 1980)(finding that recusal was not
necessary under § 455(b)(2) where a fellow attorney's relation to the matter in
controversy was as a client, not as an attorney; case reassigned to another judge
on § 455(a) appearance of partiality grounds).
44. In re Letters Rogatory from Supreme Court, 661 F. Supp. 1168, 1174 (E.D. Mich.
1987).
45. See infra note 51.
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recusal contexts. By applying a transactional standard to "matter in
controversy," the differences in the parties and the nature of the relief
sought in the two cases become immaterial to the issue of disqualifica-
tion. The same course of events is relevant to both cases, i.e., the
events leading to the assault, the facts relating to the performance of
duty, and the relative use of force are relevant in each case. Both
cases concern the same "matter in controversy."47
46. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) refers to a judge's prior role as a governmental employee in
the "case in controversy." See infra note 52.
47. See Rushing v. City of Georgiana, 361 So.2d 11, 12-13 (Ala. 1978), for a comparable
fact pattern where the court found one "matter in controversy" under Canon
3C(1)(b) of the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct.
In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976), applied the "matter in contro-
versy" in broader terms. The judge's former law partner represented the owners
of a race track, participating in drafting proposed legislation and making an un-
successful offer to purchase another race track. That race track later was
purchased by the defendants who were charged with mail fraud and racketeering
by using unlawful means to secure passage of the same legislation. These defend-
ants planned to call the judge's former law partner as a witness to show that the
conduct for which they were indicted was no more culpable than that of the client
represented by the law partner. Although the prosecution's case consisted of the
charges in the indictment, the case before the court involved the defenses as well.
The Fourth Circuit held that the former partner's work for the client before the
judge withdrew from the law firm was a "matter in controversy" within the
meaning of the federal disqualification statute, and that the judge was therefore
disqualified from presiding further in the case. Id. at 1198. The appellate panel in
Rodgers did not require the replacement judge to review all the rulings of the
disqualified judge because the petitioners agreed that the judge was not person-
ally biased or prejudiced toward them. Id.
In Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. Channel Fueling Service, 669 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Tex.
1987), a party moved to disqualify the judge from presiding over a damage suit for
fraud. Previously, one of the judge's partners had been counsel in a suit to per-
petuate testimony in order to learn about possible defamation, illegal release of
information about barge cargo, and the loss of fuel from specific barge voyages.
The court denied the motion, citing Rodgers, but recused itself due to the appear-
ance of partiality.
Other courts have given the term "matter in controversy" a more limited
meaning. In Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School District, 839
F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 869 (1988), the court found that the
trial judge's former law partner's submission of an amicus brief in a case involv-
ing "to a large extent" different issues and remedies did not require recusal. The
Eighth Circuit found that "the question of what kinds of cases are sufficiently
related for the purposes of § 455(b)(2) would remain a question of judgment and
degree." Id. at 1302. The earlier case formed part of the historical background of
the dispute in the later case. Id. at 1301.
In another case, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to recuse.
Patterson v. Masem, 774 F.2d 251, 254 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985). The trial judge had
denied a motion to consolidate a case with the older case referred to in the Little
Rock case. The court reasoned that, because the trial judge denied the motion to
consolidate, the "matter in controversy" in the older case and the current case
were not the same. Id The appellate court may have reached the correct result,
but grounding the denial of the recusal motion on the exercise of discretion in
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The fact that two lawsuits have some facts in common is not deter-
minative of the recusal issue. For example, in United States v. Ala-
bama,48 the judge had represented a party alleging a violation of equal
protection in the recruitment of. African-American athletes and the
award of scholarships by the University of Alabama. A case assigned
to the judge alleged racial segregation in all institutions of higher
learning in Alabama. The motion to recuse under § 455(b)(2) was de-
nied because the legal theories and the relevant facts of the cases were
different. While the former case concerned policies and practices thir-
teen years earlier, the pending case challenged the vestiges of de jure
segregation in all of the state universities. The court concluded that to
"hold that the actions are the same 'matter in controversy' under § 455
would suggest that [the judge] is precluded from presiding over any
kind of race discrimination claim against" any defendant. 49
The meaning of the term "matter in controversy" defines the scope
of the § 455(b)(2) prohibition. A well-drafted statute reflecting the
case law and clarifying the breadth of its coverage would both pre-
clude a judge from presiding in a case in which the judge was formerly
counsel or an associate of counsel in the matter in controversy and
include a definition of "matter in controversy." As amended,
§ 455(b)(2) would require disqualification:
(2) Where in the private practice of law, the judge's connection
with a matter in controversy was as:
(i) an attorney;
(ii) an associate of the attorney serving during the association as
counsel; or
(iii) a material witness.
A "matter in controversy" is the same transaction or course of
events.
This draft of the statutory section explains in clearer language the
proper focus of the prohibition which is disqualifying the judge based
upon prior affiliations with the matter. As to the definition of "matter
in controversy", a court still must examine the facts of each claim to
resolve a recusal motion, just as it does, for example, in assessing an
objection to joinder of parties or a defense of claim preclusion. The
important purpose in defining "matter in controversy" is to express
the intention that it is a broader term than the standards of "case" or
"proceeding" 5 0 have previously been defined or interpreted.
deciding the consolidation motion is illogical. The recusal standards are objective
and once satisfied leave no room for discretion.
48. 582 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
49. 1& at 1207.
50. See infra notes 51-52.
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2. Prior Government Employment
Recusal is also necessary when a federal judge, as a government
employee, served as counsel or an adviser in a proceeding5l or ex-
pressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in con-
troversy.52 The justification for a separate prohibition for former
government employees is recognition that lawyers in a governmental
agency do not necessarily have the same type of relationship with
other lawyers in the agency 53 as do lawyers in private practice. The
prohibition is "intended to cover the situations which can occur during
the first two or three years of judicial service of a lawyer who is ap-
pointed to the bench from service as a government lawyer."5 4 Two
issues dominate the case law: 1) the similarities and differences be-
tween the earlier governmental employment and the current case
before the judge55 and 2) the extent of prior participation as a govern-
mental employee necessary to justify disqualification.56
A typical application of the provision involves the former-prosecu-
tor-now-judge who pursued criminal investigations or indictments
against a defendant. Later, when the government is conducting an-
51. The statutory definition of a "proceeding" "includes pretrial, trial, appellate re-
view, or other stages of litigation". 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(1)(1988). The use of the
term "proceeding" in the first portion of § 455(b)(3) is probably narrower than
the term "case" as used in the pre-1974 statute and the term "matter in contro-
versy" used in § 455(b)(2).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3)(1988). Use of the phrase "particular case in controversy"
differs significantly from the phrase "matter in controversy" found in § 455(b)(2).
A case in controversy appears to refer to a specific civil claim for relief or crimi-
nal charge, in contrast to the matter in controversy previously discussed. The
latter term, as interpreted by state courts, has been given a broader meaning,
analogous to a transactional or occurrence standard. See ABRAMSON, supra note
2, at 53-54.
Another provision of § 455(b)(3) requires disqualification when the judge, as a
government employee, was a material witness in a proceeding. This standard also
requires analysis beyond simple application of the language of the statute. The
case law construing the meaning of a material witness under the Code of Judicial
Conduct suggests an analysis of whether the witness is offering testimony con-
cerning some fact affecting the merits of the case about which no other witness
will testify. See, e.g., Callahan v. State, 557 So. 2d 1292,1307-08 (Ala. Crim. App.),
afrd, 557 So. 2d 1311 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990).
53. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Commentary to Ca-
non 3 (1972). "[T]o say that all lawyers in the Justice Department or the FCC or
any other agency are to be considered in the same way that you would consider
the lawyers in a private law firm, [is] too sweeping a disqualification and there [is]
no good reason for it.. . ." Hearing on S. 1064 before the Subcommittee on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., 100 (1971-1973)(Statement of E. Thode).
54. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6351, 6355-56.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 57-59.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 60-63.
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other criminal investigation of the same defendant, the person who
was the prosecutor in the earlier case is now the judge. Disqualifica-
tion is required when the judge is asked to hear the same case in
which the judge participated as counsel,57 i.e., the former and current
cases have a common, single transaction or event at issue.58 "[A]bsent
a specific showing that that judge was previously involved with a case
while [a prosecutor] that he or she is later assigned to preside over as a
judge,"59 no recusal is necessary.
The cases also resolve the recusal issue by examining the nature
and extent of the former prosecutor's participation in the earlier case.
A former prosecutor who was counsel of record for the United States
in an earlier proceeding cannot preside over the same case as a
judge.60 One step removed from actual participation as counsel of rec-
ord is the direct supervision of the prosecutor who is trying the case.
Recusal appears necessary if the current case is factually identical to
the former case and the judge, as a former supervisory attorney,
either advised counsel of record about the case or otherwise expressed
an opinion about the merits of the case. A situation yet another step
removed from direct participation occurs when the judge's prior con-
tact with a case was merely administrative, such as where the judge's
relationship with a case was strictly formal while serving in a govern-
57. United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 1988)(citing In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 486 F.2d 1013, 1015 (3d Cir. 1973)), cert. denied sub nor. Testa
v. United States, 417 U.S. 919 (1974)).
58. When the transactions are different, recusal is unnecessary. See United States v.
Heffington, 952 F.2d 275, 279 (9th Cir. 1991)(finding recusal unnecessary where
the judge, as a federal defender, represented the instant defendant for the same
category of offense five years earlier); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1312-
13 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a prosecutor in a prior probation revocation can, as
a U.S. Magistrate, sign a search warrant in a different case involving a different
factual transaction), cert denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
59. United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
906 (1989). Often, the judge can simply observe that the acts that are the basis of
the current charge occurred after the judge's departure from the prosecutor's of-
fice. See, e.g., id. at 278. Accord Kendrick v. Carlson, 995 F.2d 1440, 1444 (8th Cir.
1993).
Somewhat less precise language was used in United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d
897, 908 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. United States, 474 U.S. 980
(1985), where the court stated: "If an indictment or investigation leading directly
to the indictment began after a former prosecutor took office as a judge, he or she
is not considered to have been 'of counsel' and is not required by § 455 to disqual-
ify himself or herself."
60. See, e.g., Mixon v. United States, 620 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1980). In this case, a Mag-
istrate was the Assistant United States Attorney who represented the prosecu-
tion in an earlier motion to reduce the sentence. When a later motion to reduce
the sentence was filed, the former prosecutor had become the Magistrate.
Although neither the Magistrate nor counsel noticed the problem at the time and
the district court ratified the Magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the Fifth Circuit treated the proceedings and the disposition by the district court
as a nullity because of the disqualification. Id. at 487.
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mental position such as United States Attorney or Attorney Gen-
eral.61 In the statute,
the word "participated" implies a higher degree of activity than simply being
"of counsel." The latter association with a case arises simply because the pros-
ecutor holds his office. One need do nothing to be "of counsel." "Participa-
tion" connotes activity, however. One cannot "participate" without doing
something.
... Mandatory disqualification then is restricted to those cases in which a
judge had previously taken a part, albeit small, in the investigation, prepara-
tion, or prosecution of a case.
6 2
Even a merely administrative role in a case may suggest participa-
tion, however. For example, a United States Attorney may review and
approve immunity applications or review and submit applications for
the empanelment of a grand jury. Such activities may suggest partici-
pation which later requires disqualification.63 In Muench v. Israel,64
after a judge denied a petition for habeas corpus, the petitioner sought
relief from the judgment because the judge should have refused to
consider the merits of the petition. The judge formerly represented
the State of Wisconsin as Attorney General pursuant to statutory du-
ties at the time petitioner had appealed a criminal conviction to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. The habeas corpus petition raised issues
similar to those in the state appeal. In denying petitioner's motion for
relief from judgment, the court found that the substance of the rela-
tionship to the state appeal had been "merely pro forma". 65 To reach
the conclusion that he had not "participated" as counsel in the state
appeal, the judge examined the structure of the Attorney General's
office and the case management procedures at the time he had served
as Attorney General.6 6
61. Muench v. Israel, 524 F. Supp. 1115, 1118 (E.D. Wis. 1981). See John P. Frank,
Disqualifiwation of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 624 (1947)(observing that "there is
no impropriety where the judge's role as prosecutor has been largely formal, as in
the case of Attorneys General, who have only theoretical responsibility for minor
cases in their departments"). For examples of United States Supreme Court Jus-
tices who declined recusal in Justice Department cases where their connection
with the cases while employed there was purely formal, see Laird v. Tatum, 409
U.S. 824 (1972), and Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
62. United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1326 (10th Cir. 1988)(holding that judge
who had been a United States Attorney during the initial prosecution of the de-
fendant, but did not participate as counsel, was not disqualified from presiding
over the case).
63. Cf. United States v. Pepper & Potter, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 123, 125 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (finding it unnecessary to resolve the participation issue, concluding instead
that recusal was required under § 455(a)).
64. 524 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
65. Id. at 1119.
66. Id. at 1118-19.
There are no facts in the instant case to suggest petitioner's appeal to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court was handled differently than the usual proce-
dure followed by the Criminal Appeals Unit, or that this Court stepped
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Rather than focusing on the scope of participation, some courts
have examined the timing of the employee's departure from the gov-
ernment position later giving rise to concern about judicial objectivity.
In United States v. Kelly,67 the United States Attorney became a dis-
trict judge after the offense was committed but before it was discov-
ered, investigated or prosecuted. The appellate court affirmed the
judge's denial of the recusal motion under any possible reading of the
statute finding that the relevant date for deciding the disqualification
issue was the date the prosecution was initiated, not the date of the
underlying offense. First, no "proceeding" 68 had begun when the
judge was still a prosecutor. Second, the judge had not "participated"
by taking some active role in the proceeding. Finally, the judge had
not been counsel "concerning" the case because the investigation had
not begun until after the judge left office. 69
In summary, an approach focusing on the extent of a judge's earlier
participation in a case as a governmental employee results in inconsis-
tent application of the statutory standard. Is there a more precise way
to express the legislative concern in this area and spare courts the task
outside its predominant role and assumed an active posture in peti-
tioner's case. Indeed, this Court did not have personal knowledge of that
appeal, nor did it express any opinion on the merits of petitioner's case.
To say that this Court "participated as counsel" in petitioner's appeal
would be to ignore the realities of case management within the complex
bureaucracy of the Wisconsin Attorney General's Office.
Id. at 1119. See Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989)(affirming lower
court's denial of a motion for disqualification where the defendant in a civil rights
claim against the state assistant Attorney General argued for recusal on the basis
that the judge once held the same governmental position as the defendant).
67. 556 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1017 (1978).
68. See supra note 51.
69. United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1017
(1978).
The statutory prohibition applies not only to those who have acted as counsel
or adviser, but also to judges who, as government employees, expressed an opin-
ion about the merits of a particular case. Undoubtedly, counsel of record and
their advisers express oral or written views as participants in the adversary pro-
cess. Other government employees may have opportunities to express their
views as well. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 683 F. Supp. 70, 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1988)(finding no appearance of partiality by a judge who, as a public employee,
had made general statements concerning the investigatory competence of the de-
partment the judge had headed, but who had not made specific statements about
the particular personnel or investigations that were the subject of case at bar).
In Limeco, Inc. v. Division of Lime, 571 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Miss. 1983), a party
successfully sought recusal of the judge who, forty-one years earlier, as a legisla-
tor, had voted against a measure establishing limestone crushing plants as a state-
sponsored function. Thus, the party argued, the judge had expressed an opinion
on the merits of state-run lime crushing plants, an issue apparently implicit in the
case at bar. Because the judge could not recall the vote itself, much less rationale
for the vote, the judge granted the recusal motion based on the appearance of a
long-standing adverse opinion about state operation of lime crushing plants.
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of construing terms like "participated" or "expressed an opinion"?
The following redrafted subsection would mandate recusal:
(3) Where as a government employee, the judge:
(i) as an attorney or a material witness participated personally
and substantially in a proceeding; or
(ii) expressed an opinion about the merits of a matter in
controversy.
This statutory maxim for judicial recusal is clearer and more precise
than the current statute. It also accurately reflects the case law at this
point. The reference to personal and substantial participation more
clearly defines the scope of the judge's prior participation in a matter,
and is analogous to the Model Rule of Professional Conduct standard
for attorneys moving from government to private employment.70
Even if the judge did not participate personally and substantially, the
judge can still be disqualified by having expressed an opinion on the
merits of the matter in controversy. Moreover, even without both per-
sonal and substantial participation by the judge, the possibility of
recusal remains under the § 455(a) "appearance of partiality" residu-
ary standard.
3. Family Relationships
Judicial disqualification may also be necessary when the judge or a
close relative of the judge has some connection with a proceeding.71
Disqualification is mandatory when a relative of the judge or the
judge's spouse, who falls within the third degree of relationship as cal-
culated according to the civil law system, 72 is involved in the proceed-
ing. Involvement in a proceeding requires disqualification if the judge
or the close relative: 1) is a party or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party; 2) is, to the judge's knowledge, likely to be a material witness; 3)
is acting as an attorney or 4) is known by the judge to have an interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome. 73
Two issues dominate the case law on recusal when the judge or the
70. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(a)(1983).
71. See supra note 51 for a discussion of the statutory definition of "proceeding."
72. 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(b)(5), (d)(2)(1988). Because the civil law system traditionally
recognizes only blood relationships, the third degree of relationship standard dis-
qualifies on the basis of a judge's or the judge's spouse's parent, grandparent, un-
cle, aunt, brother, sister, niece, nephew, son, or daughter.
The American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct was amended in
1990 to explicitly define the third degree of relationship. It includes the above
relatives, plus great-grandparents and great-grandchildren. AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCATION, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology (1990).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i)-(iv)(1988). The last of the four disqualifying criteria is
discussed in the text dealing with financial and other interests. See infra notes
103-106 and accompanying text.
Despite the broad statutory prohibition against a judge presiding over a case
where the judge's relative is involved, § 455(c) limits the judge's duty of inquiry
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judge's relative is a party to the proceeding. First, despite the appar-
ent clarity of the statute, automatic disqualification is unnecessary
when the court perceives that the judge or a relative has been named
as a party by a plaintiff engaged in judge-shopping.74 Similarly, when
all judges are named as parties to a lawsuit, the applicable legal
maxim is that if all are disqualified, none is disqualified.75 The second
primary issue involves the situation in which the judge or a close rela-
tive is a member of the class in a class action. Prior to certification of
the class, it may be permissible for the judge to issue orders.7 6 Once
the judge or close relative is a member of a certified class, the defini-
about such matters to the financial interests of the judge, the judge's spouse and
the judge's minor children residing in the judge's household.
Other circumstances involving judges' relatives are decided under the § 455(a)
appearance of partiality standard. See, e.g., In re of Billedeaux, 972 F.2d 104, 105-
06 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a claim that the judge's spouse is a partner in the
firm which, though not counsel in the instant case, represents the instant party in
other cases, is too remote and speculative to warrant recusal); Datagate, Inc. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 941 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1991)(finding that the employ-
ment relationship between a party and the judge's child is one factor to consider,
other factors are number of employees, the nature of the judge's child's position,
and whether the child's employment area is involved in case), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1667 (1992); Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 33 (8th Cir. 1990)(finding no ap-
pearance of partiality in a labor law case when the judge's spouse is a labor law
specialist not connected with the case), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991); Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1989)(hold-
ing that employment by a party of the judge's offspring does not, in and of itself,
mandate disqualification), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076 (1990); In re Faulkner, 856
F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1988)(finding the appearance of partiality where a relative
communicated to the judge material facts and opinions about the case before the
judge and where the relative was an important participant in transactions form-
ing the basis for the indictment); TV Communications Network, Inc. v. ESPN,
Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1077, 1079-80 (D. Colo. 1991)(finding no appearance of partiality
when the judge's relative was employed by a shareholder of a party); In re
Hathaway Ranch Partnership, 116 B.R. 208, 215 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990)(finding
no question of the judge's impartiality when the judge's spouse's law firm repre-
sented a bankruptcy litigant in cases other than the one before the judge).
74. A blatant example of judge-shopping occurred in Andersen v. Roszkowski, 681 F.
Supp. 1284, 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1988), affd, 894 F.2d 1338 (1990), where the plaintiff
added the judge as a party-defendant only after the judge dismissed the com-
plaint. The judge denied the motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i).
Id. at 1289.
An alternative statutory source for denying such motions is the appearance of
partiality standard in § 455(a). When a plaintiff is dissatisfied with the judge as-
signed to the case before or after pretrial rulings, the plaintiff may allege per-
sonal bias, but usually loses the recusal motion. See, e.g., State v. Meyer, 571 P.2d
550, 553 (Or. Ct. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Leventhal, 307 N.E.2d 839, 841
(Mass. 1974).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1976), cert denied,
431 U.S. 967 (1977).
76. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 719 F.2d 733,
734-35 (5th Cir. 1983) (referring to a letter from the Advisory Committee on Codes
of Judicial Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States); LeRoy v.
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tion of a "party" becomes important. In the absence of a statutory
definition, courts distinguish between classes where some financial or
other interest is at stake7 7 (possibly requiring disqualification) and
other classes such as civil rights classes (no disqualification) where the
judge's concern is no different than any other judge or lay person.78
Disqualification is also required when the judge knows that he or
she is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. "The purpose
of this provision is to prevent a judge from having to pass on the com-
petence and veracity of his own testimony given with respect to a mat-
ter presently in controversy before him."79 A material witness is a
person who gives testimony about some fact affecting the merits of a
case and about which no other witness will testify. A judge's back-
ground information about the controversy at issue does not make the
judge a material witness.80
Recusal is necessary when a relative of the judge is acting as a law-
yer in the proceeding.S1 Judicial interpretation of the statutory probi-
City of Houston, 592 F. Supp. 415,419 (S.D. Tex. 1984)("If the case at bar is not a
class action, I am only a member of a putative class.").
77. See infra text accompanying notes 85-106.
78. In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1984). In Houston, the court
observed:
Many civil rights suits are brought in the form of class actions. Consider-
ing the broad declaratory and injunctive relief that federal courts are
called upon to dispense, it is hard to imagine a case in which a minorityjudge would not have a family member within the class - and thus....
within the definition of "party."
Id. at 930. Accord, United States v. State of Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1542 (11th
Cir. 1987)(holding disqualification to be unnecessary where judge's children were
part of a certified class defined as all children eligible to attend public higher
education institutions in the Montgomery, Alabama, area), cert denied, 487 U.S.
1210 (1988).
79. In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 543 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1976). The
court went on to state:
The mere fact that [the judge] may have testified with respect to some
wholly unrelated matter should not disqualify him .... since it does not
require him to pass upon the credibility of his own testimony and there
is no reason to suppose that his decision might be affected by his unre-
lated testimony.
Id.
When a judge is scheduled to be a material witness in a proceeding, the judge
can nevertheless decide the propriety of holding such a proceeding. See, e.g., King
v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 850 (1978).
80. See, e.g., In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, 726 F. Supp. 288, 291-92 (D.
Kan. 1989)(finding that judge's testimony before federal agency given years
before provided only background information). See also In re A.H. Robins Co.,
Inc., 602 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D. Kan. 1985)(finding that judge's affidavit in support
of a fellow judge in a disciplinary proceeding commenced at the request of the
same party seeking recusal, was filed in a judicial capacity and did not relate to
the merits of the case).
81. Attorneys have at times attempted to use this provision as a matter of legal strat-
egy. In McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983), the
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bition requires actual participation by the relative in the proceeding,8 2
but recusal may be necessary even though the relative has not filed a
formal appearance.8 3 Because the scope of the section is limited to
lawyers who actually participate, a relative's affiliation with the law
firm appearing as counsel does not constitute actual participation.8 4
A new subsection clarifying the current language of § 455(b)(5)
would require disqualification when:
judge's brother-in-law apparently was retained by the defendants in order to dis-
qualify the judge six years after the plaintiffs filed their complaint. On appeal of
the judge's reassignment order, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case, stating that
the judge should have immediately reassigned the case after becoming aware of
the judge's relative's employment as counsel. Id. at 1257. On remand, the trial
court was to determine whether the sole or primary motive for hiring the judge's
relative had been to disqualify the judge. Id. at 1265. If so, the relative was to be
disqualified. The Court of Appeals observed:
If a party who is offended by a judge's ruling could disqualify the
judge by employing new counsel after the case has been pending before
that judge for years, he could force on other litigants and the courts the
penalty of starting over before a new judge .... If, after seeing who the
judge is or weighing his rulings for a period of years, a litigant could in
effect veto the allotment and obtain a new judge by the simple expedient
of finding one of the judge's relatives who is willing to act as counsel, it
would become possible for any party to disrupt preparation for, or, in-
deed, the trial itself.
... The general rule of law is clear: a lawyer may not enter a case for
the primary purpose of forcing the presiding judge's recusal.
Id. at 1263-65.
82. United States ex reL Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
Recusal is unnecessary when the judge's relative withdraws from the proceed-
ing prior to any substantive actions by the judge in the case. See S.J. Groves &
Sons Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F.2d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir.
1978)(holding recusal to be unnecessary where the judge's brother was a senior
partner in the firm which was counsel of record, but withdrew before substantive
decisions were made by judge).
However, resignation of the relative from the law firm representing the party
does not cure the violation when the relative has participated in such pretrial
matters as taking depositions.
A party should not be required to object to questions in depositions
asked by members of the judge's family. Whether the deposition will be
used or not, it is there to be used. Whether it will be important or not, it
is there to become important. The statute contemplates a bright line
test.
In re Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1147 (6th Cir. 1990)(Kennedy, J.,
concurring)
83. See McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1259 (5th Cir. 1983)(dis-
qualifing the judge because his relative participated in the discovery aspect of the
case even though the relative was not counsel of record).
84. See, e.g., Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1112-13 (5th
Cir.) (holding that the fact that the judge's father was a partner of counsel of rec-
ord did not require disqualification), cert denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); Wilmington
Towing Co. v. Cape Fear Towing Co., 624 F. Supp. 1210, 1211 (E.D.N.C.
1986)(holding recusal to be unnecessary where the judge's son was a summer as-
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(5) the judge, the judge's spouse, or a person within the third de-
gree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such
person:
(i) Is a party (or officer, director, or trustee of a party) to the
proceeding, unless the evidence shows either that such person has
been named as a party merely to compel recusal or that such per-
son has an interest in the case which is no different than any other
person;
(ii) Is personally and substantially acting as an attorney in the
proceeding;, or
(iii) Is known by the judge to be a likely material witness in the
proceeding.
This rewritten statute codifies the case law construing the issues dis-
cussed in this section and contains standards that should be easier for
a judge to apply prospectively. In proposed subsection (5)(i), the stan-
dard for recusal includes the previously discussed exceptions which
courts have applied to avoid litigants' manipulation of the recusal pro-
cess. Proposed (5)(ii) requires automatic recusal only when the rela-
tive is acting as an attorney in the proceeding as opposed to merely
being a member of the party's law firm.
4. Financial and Other Interests
A judge also must be disqualified when the judge "knows that he,
individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in
his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in contro-
versy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding."85 The
sociate and had tentatively accepted an offer with the firm that was counsel of
record).
The Commentary to Canon 3C of the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct
noted:
The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with
which the lawyer-relative of the judge is affiliated does not itself disqual-
ify the judge. Under appropriate circumstances, the fact that "his impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned" under Canon 3C(1), or that the
lawyer-relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm
that could be "substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding"
.. may require his disqualification.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4)(1991). The provision was enacted not only to conform with
the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct but also because there was a concern that a
"judge's direct economic or financial interest, even though relatively small, in the
outcome of the case may well be inconsistent with due process." H.R. REP. No.
1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reinnted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6356. The
provision disqualifies a judge from presiding over a case even when the judge is
not the fact-finder. Gladhill v. General Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049,1051 (4th Cir.
1984).
Although the federal statute does not define the meaning of "knows", the 1990
version of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct defines "knows" as actual knowl-
1993] 1069
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1046
legislative concern underlying this provision is that a "judge's direct
economic or financial interest, even though relatively small, in the
outcome of the case may well be inconsistent with due process."86
Several preliminary observations about this prohibition are in or-
der. First, the judge must know both that a potentially compromising
interest exists and that the interest involves either the subject matter
in controversy or a party before the judges 7 Second, this automatic
recusal provision extends only to minor children residing with the
judge.8 8 Courts address the disqualifying interests of adult children
under the residuary appearance of partiality clause.89 Third, two
types of disqualifying interests require recusal: 1) a financial interest
and 2) any other interest. The latter interest requires recusal only
when it could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceed-
ing, but a financial interest commands recusal if no specified exception
applies and regardless of whether the outcome of the proceeding could
have any effect on the interest.90 Finally, unlike other grounds for
disqualification already discussed, recusal may not be required if the
disqualifying financial interest is divested.91
edge of facts and knowledge that may be inferred from the circumstances. AMER-
icAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF JuDicIAL CoNDuCr, Terminology (1990).
In addition, the 1990 Code expands the bases for disqualification under this
provision well beyond the federal statute to include economic interests of the
judge's parents or children of any age, regardless of whether they share the same
household, and to any member of the judge's family residing in the judge's house-
hold. Id. Cannon 3(E)(1)(C).
86. H.R. REPORT No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6356. For a discussion of issues related to disqualification for
financial interests, see Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as
Grounds for Disqualifcation of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662,
698-705 (1985).
87. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 866-67 (1988)(find-
ing a violation of § 455(b)(4) where the judge had actual knowledge of a conflict
of interest as a fiduciary for an entity with an interest in the litigation, but did not
step down); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1256, 1257-58 (N.D. Cal.
1987)(holding that the disqualification based on a judge's financial interest in a
party applies only to rulings made after the judge has knowledge of such disquali-
fying interest).
88. See, e.g., Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078
(1988); In re National Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1988).
89. In re National Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1226, 1229 (7th Cir. 1988).
90. In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 688 F.2d 1297, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982); In re New
Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, 620 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 1980); Sol-
lenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. 776, 780 (D. N.M. 1989).
91. If the judge discovers that the judge, the judge's spouse, or minor child residing in
the judge's household has a financial interest in a party, 28 U.S.C. § 455(f) permits
a judge to continue presiding over a matter after devoting substantial judicial
time to it if the holder of the interest divests it. Section 455(f) permits a trial
judge to cure a disqualification. In re Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136,
1147 (6th Cir. 1990)(Kennedy, J., concurring). Its existence "suggests that Con-
gress intended to exclude the types of cure not permitted by this provision, for
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A financial interest is "ownership of a legal or equitable interest,
however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active
participant in the affairs of a party ... ,,92 Even the slightest financial
interest by the judge, the judge's spouse or the judge's minor child
requires disqualification.9 3 Courts often assume the presence of a fi-
Congress had the opportunity to enact a broader amendment than it devised with
section 455(f)." Id. (holding that the resignation of the judge's daughter from the
firm involved in the proceeding did not fall under § 455(f) and did not otherwise
cure the statutory violation).
The rationale for this provision appears to spring from the concerns expressed
in such documents as UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON CODES OF CONDuCT, Advisory Opinion No. 69 (1981), which states:
In those cases in which a great deal of time and effort had been invested
by the judge, by counsel, and by the litigants, when the existence of the
disqualifying interest came to light, the public interest in the efficient
administration of justice would appear to outweigh concern for an ap-
pearance that the judge is seeking to continue participation in a particu-
lar case.
For example, in Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. v. Maxus Energy Corp., 925 F.2d 556,
561 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2829 (1991), the judge and the judge's spouse
sold their stock in a corporation which held a large percentage of the outstanding
stock of a party as soon as the judge learned of the relationship between their
ownership and the party. The Second Circuit approved of the judge's curative
action under § 455(f) which avoided the waste of "three years of the litigants'
time and resources and substantial judicial efforts" in the case. Id.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4)(1988)(emphasis added).
The definition of a financial interest has four exceptions. First, ownership in a
mutual or common investment fund in which the judge does not participate in
managing the fund is not a financial interest. § 455(d)(4)(i). The likely effect of a
decision on the value of the securities held through such a fund is irrelevant.
New York City Dev. Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976,979-80 (7th Cir. 1986). Second, an
office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization does
not constitute a financial interest in securities held by the organization.
§ 455(d)(4)(ii). Third, a proprietary interest in an organization such as an insured
in a mutual insurance company, a depositor in a mutual savings association, or
similar proprietary interest, and ownership of government securities, if the pro-
ceeding's outcome could not substantially affect the value of the interest, are not
financial interests. § 455(d)(4)(iii). See Christiansen v. National Say. and Trust
Co., 683 F.2d 520, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(finding that judges subscribing to a health
insurance program hold an exempt "similar proprietary interest").
The 1990 ABA Code replaced the term "financial interest" with the term
"economic interest." An economic interest "denotes ownership of more than a de
minimis legal or equitable interest," unlike the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Con-
duct which required disqualification for any financial interest however small.
"'De minimis' denotes an insignificant interest that could not raise reasonable
question as to a judge's impartiality." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF JU-
DICIAL CONDUC, Terminology (1990). Otherwise, the definition is comparable to
the 1972 ABA Code definition of a financial interest.
93. See, e.g., Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1503 (9th Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989); New York City Housing Dev. Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d
976, 980 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 688 F.2d 1297, 1308 (9th
Cir. 1982), affd mem. 459 U.S. 1191 (1983); In re New Mexico Natural Gas Anti-
trust Litigation, 620 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 1980).
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nancial interest and are usually more adept at identifying what is not a
financial interest. Bar association membership, for example, is not a
financial interest. 94 A remote, contingent or speculative benefit or in-
terest is not a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy 95
or in a party9 6 to the proceeding.
Congress replaced [the previously existing standard with] a flat prohibi-
tion. Although the prohibition results in recusal in cases where the in-
terest is too small to sway even the most mercenary judge, occasional
silly results may be an acceptable price to pay for a rule that both is
straightforward in application and spares the judge from having to make
decisions under an uncertain standard apt to be misunderstood.
Union Carbide Corp. v. United States Cutting Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 714 (7th
Cir. 1986).
The Cement litigation presents a graphic example of the operation of this ethi-
cal standard. The judge's spouse owned a stock interest worth $29.70 in several
members of a plaintiff class. The consequence of holding that the statutory term
"party" included class members was that a new judge had to be found. "[A]fter
five years of litigation, a multi-million dollar lawsuit of major national impor-
tance, with over 200,000 class plaintiffs, grinds to a halt over... $29.70." In re
Cement Antitrust Litigation, 688 F.2d at 1313. See supra note 91.
94. Plechner v. Widener College, Inc., 569 F.2d 1250, 1262 (3d Cir. 1977).
95. Neither the statute nor the legislative history provides guidance concerning the
meaning of the phrase "in the subject matter in controversy." In Department of
Energy v. Brimmer, 673 F.2d 1287, 1295 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), the court
reasoned that the use of the term "subject matter" suggested that this portion of
the statute would be most significant in in rem proceedings. The Third Circuit
relied on a dictionary definition in United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 234
(1982), cert denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983).
96. See, e.g., Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1503 (9th Cir. 1987)(find-
ing a judge's security interest in a nearby property too remote), cert denied, 489
U.S. 1090 (1989); Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1414
(8th Cir. 1983)(finding that disposition of the land claim would not affect the
judge's title to nearby land); Christiansen v. National Say. and Trust Co., 683 F.2d
520, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(finding the interest of a judge who was a subscriber to a
health plan in the lawsuit seeking a refund of interest was too remote); In re
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 366-67 (4th Cir. 1976)(finding that the
judge held a bare expectancy in the utility's refund); In re New Mexico Natural
Gas Antitrust Litigation, 620 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding the judge's sta-
tus as a natural gas consumer to be insubstantial).
"In cases where the judge has a financial interest ... in a non-party, the court
examines how direct an effect the litigation before it will have on the interested
non-party." Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. 776, 781
(D.N.M. 1989). See also McCann v. Communications Design Corp., 775 F. Supp.
1535, 1540-41 (D. Conn. 1991)(finding no recusal to be required where the judge
was a trustee of the university receiving donations from a party's parent corpora-
tion). The judge's financial interest may be in a separate entity which is in the
same industry as a litigant before the judge whose decision financially may affect
both the litigant and the separate entity. For example, in In re Placid Oil Co., 802
F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986), the judge held a large investment in a non-party bank
that could have been affected by any rulings in the case. The parties argued that
any rulings adverse to the party banks would dramatically affect the entire bank-
ing industry and therefore the judge's investment. The Fifth Circuit denied a
writ of mandamus, refusing to adopt a rule requiring recusal in every case in
which a judge has a stake in a company in the same industry as one of the parties
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Even if a judge or a judge's close relative lacks a financial interest
in a party or the subject matter, recusal is still necessary if the person
has "any other interest that could be substantially affected by the out-
come of the proceeding." Although no statutory definition exists for
"any other interest", courts have inferred that it includes an interest
not entailing direct ownership in a party or the subject matter in con-
troversy.97 Courts have determined that, unlike a "financial interest"
where any such interest however small requires recusal, a judge with
a de minimis "other interest" may preside over a case if the litigation
could not substantially affect that interest.98 For example, in In re
New Mezico Gas Antitrust Litigation,99 the Tenth Circuit reversed a
sua sponte order of recusal by a judge who was a natural gas con-
sumer, holding that the judge's interest was too insubstantial to war-
rant disqualification.100 The court also identified the practical and
to the case. The whole industry was not the subject matter in controversy. Id. at
786-87. Similarly, in Department of Energy v. Brimmer, 673 F.2d 1287, 1295
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), the judge's ownership of a stock interest in energy
companies participating in the same government regulatory program as the plain-
tiff was not a financial interest in the subject matter of the litigation because the
judge lacked a direct economic or financial interest in the outcome.
In Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. at 783-84, the
court decided that its financial interest in non-party entities which were once part
of a single entity was within the subject matter in controversy and required
recusal. The litigation related to predivestiture conduct in the telephone indus-
try, and contingent liability provisions of the reorganization plan connected the
party and non-party entities together for predivestiture debts. Finally, in United
States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983), the
court held that a judge could preside over a criminal case even though the judge
owned stock in a non-party corporation which was a corporate victim of the
crime. Although the stock ownership was a financial interest, the outcome of the
case could have no effect on the defrauded company. Without a connection to the
judge's financial interest, the case did not draw his interest into the subject mat-
ter of the controversy. Id. at 234-35.
97. See Department of Energy v. Brimmer, 673 F.2d 1287,1295 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1982); In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, 620 F.2d 794 (10th Cir.
1980); In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 367-68 (4th Cir. 1976).
98. Department of Energy v. Brimmer, 673 F.2d 1287, 1295 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1982). See In re Virginia Elec. & Power, 539 F.2d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 1976)("[A]
judge who is a customer of a company must necessarily consider the remoteness
of the interest and its extent or degree.").
99. 620 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980).
100. Congress did not intend to require disqualification in all cases in which
the judge might benefit as a member of the general public.... First, the
policy to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial
system is not served to as great an extent by disqualifying a judge who
would receive only such a benefit. It is not simply a question of de
minimis effect; a personal benefit or detriment shared in common with
the community at large is perceived to have a different psychological ef-
fect on a judge than would a benefit or detriment not so shared.
Id. at 796-97. Similarly, in United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532,1541 (11th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988), the judge's two minor children were
members of a class of all children eligible to attend universities in the Montgom-
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systemic costs of a broad recusal rule. First, it is very common for
litigation to have far-reaching effects. Where a party involved is a
business or regulated industry which can pass on any loss to a large
number of consumers, a judgment against that party can increase the
judge's cost of living. Second, reassignment of cases can cause substan-
tial inconvenience to counsel, parties and judges, especially when liti-
gation takes several years to complete.101
A redrafted recusal provision dealing with financial and other in-
terests should clarify the prohibition in line with the case law on this
issue. In the following form, a judge would be prohibited from presid-
ing over a case when:
(4) The judge knows about an interest which is more than de
minimis which is:
(i) a personal or fiduciary financial interest in the subject of or a
party to a proceeding, or
(ii) any other interest which could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding, either of which type of interest is
held by the judge, the judge's spouse, the judge's parent, or the
judge's child, or the spouse of any of them.
The proposed changes set forth above are comparable to several modi-
fications already made by the American Bar Association in its 1990
Code of Judicial Conduct.O2 The primary substantive change effected
by the statute would be to eliminate automatic recusal when the inter-
est involved is merely de minimis. Obviously, it may be preferable to
quantify this interest for ease of prospective application. 103 In addi-
tion, the proposed language requires recusal for a financial or any
other interest held by any child of the judge, not merely minor chil-
dren living with the judge. Finally, the scope of close relatives here is
expanded to include interests held by the judge's parent as well as the
judge's spouse and child. Including a judge's parents completes the
triad of close relatives who are subject to this standard.
A closely related, but somewhat broader issue of recusal arises
under § 455(b)(iii) when the judge knows that the judge or the judge's
relative has an interest that could be substantially affected by the out-
ery, Alabama area. As Alabama residents, they were technically members of the
class and possessed an interest in the outcome of the case. The court concluded
that the interest of the children was not "substantial" enough to require recusal
by their parent. Id "Any potential interest [by the children] ... is shared by all
young black Alabamians." Id
101. In re New Mexico Gas Antitrust Litigation, 602 F.2d 794, 797 (10th Cir. 1980).
102. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuCr Canon
3(E)(1)(C)(1990).
103. The 1990 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct's attempt to define "de minimis" is not
very helpful. Under the Code, "'De minimis' denotes an insignificant interest
that could not raise reasonable question as to a judge's impartiality." AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology (1990).
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come of the proceeding.o 4 The nature of the interest may be eco-
nomic' 05 or non-economic.106 For example, when the judge's relative
is a partner in the law firm representing a party before the judge-rela-
tive, a win or a loss in the lawsuit could substantially affect the part-
ner's interest in the law "firm's reputation, its relationship with its
clients, and its ability to attract new clients." 107
A new subsection further clarifying the current language of§ 455(b)(5) and reflecting the case law would require disqualification
when:
(5) the judge, the judge's spouse, or a person within the third de-
gree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such
person:
104. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii)(1988). The interest must have the potential to be sub-
stantially affected by the outcome. The case law is split on the scope of the term
"substantially." The broad view is that any relative's law firm has an interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of a proceeding before the
judge. See McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1260 (5th Cir.
1983)(recusal required when judge's brother-in-law was retained as counsel by a
party); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1113 (5th Cir.) (the stat-
ute requires disqualification when the relative's interest could actually or poten-
tially be affected by the result), cert denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
The narrower view is that the loss of a client or a client's case substantially
affects the firm's (and therefore the relative's) interest only if the client is a ma-
jor client with no other outside counsel. See Diversifoods, Inc. v. Diversifoods,
Inc., 595 F. Supp. 133, 139 (N.D. Ill. 1984)(holding that the loss of a party as a
client would not affect a substantial pecuniary or nonpecuniary interest of the
judge's spouse's law firm).
105. Presumably, the "interest" referred to in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii) includes a fi-
nancial interest. For example, in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bell &
Beckwith, 28 B.R. 285, 287 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983), the judge used the definition
of a financial interest in 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4) to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(5)(iii) after concluding that the his nephew and his spouse held customer
accounts with the debtor in a bankruptcy action.
106. SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 115-16 (7th Cir. 1977). See Hearings
on S. 1064 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52, 106-108 (1973).
107. Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101,1113 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 449
U.S. 820 (1980). See McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1260 (5th
Cir. 1983). By contrast, the judge's relative's status as an associate in the law firm
removes the concerns connected with partners. See United States ex rel Wein-
berger v. Equifax, Inc. 557 F.2d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035
(1978).
When the judge's relative is receiving fixed compensation as "of counsel" to a
firm representing a party before the judge, the relative has no discernible finan-
cial or nonfinancial interest. Miller Indus., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F.
Supp. 84, 86 (S.D. Ala. 1980).
When a law firm withdraws from the representation of a party, the law firm
arguably lacks the requisite statutory, disqualifying interest (financial or other-
wise). See S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F.2d
1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1978)(holding that withdrawal of the judge's brother's law
firm cured the disqualifying interest).
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(iv) Is known by the judge to have an interest, including an inter-
est as a member of a law firm that is counsel of record in the pro-
ceeding, that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding.
As the case law suggests, the related standard in proposed (5)(iv)
would prohibit the judge from sitting in a case if a relative was part of
the party's firm and had an interest in the outcome of the proceeding.
5. Law C7erks: Another "Bright-Line" Standard?
Although the practice of hiring law clerks is little more than a cen-
tury old,108 law clerks are an essential part of a judge's staff.
The law clerk has no statutorily defined duties but rather performs a broad
range of functions to assist his judge.... The association with law clerks is also
valuable to the judge; in addition to relieving [the judge] of many clerical and
administrative chores, law clerks may serve as sounding boards for ideas,
often affording a different perspective, may perform research, and may aid in
drafting memoranda, orders and opinions.
... A law clerk, by virtue of [the] position, is obviously privy to [the] judge's
thoughts in a way that the parties cannot be.1 0 9
While "the clerk is forbidden to do all that is prohibited to the
judge,"11o the language of § 455(b) is unambiguous in that it addresses
conflicts involving only a judge's prior or current professional and per-
sonal interests.' Judicial disqualification decisions relating to the
conduct and relationships of judicial clerks are therefore made under
the § 455(a) appearance of partiality standard. Most of the decisions
pertain to: 1) what the clerk does before or after acceptance of em-
108. See Fredonia Broadcasting Corp., Inc. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 255 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978):
Historically, the practice of employing federal judicial law clerks began
in 1882 when Justice Horace Gray was appointed to the Supreme Court.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who continued this practice when he
succeeded Justice Gray, termed law clerks "puisne judges." Congress
has provided that "district judges may appoint necessary law clerks." 28
U.S.C. § 752 (1970).
109. Id. at 255-56.
110. Hall v. Small Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175,179 (5th Cir. 1983). See Baugh v. City
of Milwaukee, 829 F. Supp. 274, 275-76 (E.D. Wis. 1993)(law clerk's marriage to
party not basis for recusal, because clerk was never assigned to work on spouse's
case).
111. Because of the specific and forceful nature of [§ 455(b)], it must be con-
strued narrowly. Thus, when Congress says judges, it means judges; not
their law clerks, secretaries or courtroom staff. The various staff mem-
bers of a judge may have something to do with the public's perception of
that court - but Congress wisely left that matter to an ad hoc interpreta-
tion by the courts when it fashioned Section 455(a).... Congress' certain
designation of one person, a judge, in the limiting language of Section
455(b), is an absolute exclusion of all others, including law clerks.
In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 129 F.R.D. 409, 412 (D.P.R.
1989).
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ployment with counsel for a party in a case in the judge's court and 2)
when the former clerk appears in a case before the judge.
During the period when he or she is simultaneously interviewing
for a future job and clerking for a judge, the law clerk should be cau-
tious to avoid the appearance of impropriety. It is doubtful that any
clerk would attempt to influence a judicial decision on behalf of a law
firm or party with whom the clerk was interviewing. A prospective
employer's interest in hiring the law clerk as an associate would likely
be diminished if the employer believed that the clerk had been dis-
loyal to his or her most recent employer. In order to give the judge the
option of removing a clerk from a case, the clerk should advise the
judge about future job possibilities well before a job offer is extended
to the clerk. Preferably, the judge should be advised as soon as any
contact is made between the clerk and a law firm which has the goal of
prospective employment. Though reallocation of the clerk's workload
with the judge may result, the judge could still preside over the
case. 112
Once a law clerk accepts an offer of employment with an attorney
who is counsel for a party in a case pending before the clerk's judge,
the clerk should cease further participation in the case.1 13 If the judge
removes the clerk from all cases involving the clerk's future employer
immediately upon the clerk's notification to the judge about a job of-
fer, no reasonable impression of judicial impropriety exists if the judge
continues to preside in the case.1 1 4 By contrast, courts require disqual-
ification of the judge when the clerk continues to work on a case in-
volving the clerk's future employer after the clerk has accepted an
offer of employment.115
112. If a judge could be disqualified merely because the judge's law clerks are inter-
viewing with the best law firms or parties appearing before the judge, the incen-
tive for the judge to hire the best clerks available would be reduced.
113. Several cases cite the contents of ALViN B. RuBiN & LAURA B. BARTELL, LAW
CLERK HANDBOOK 23 (rev. ed. 1989), which is distributed to many federal law
clerks and contains a somewhat broader standard than that cited in the text:
"When a clerk has accepted a position with an attorney or with a firm, that clerk
should cease further involvement in those cases in which the future employer has
an interest."
114. See, eg., Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 902 F.2d 703, 714-15
(9th Cir. 1990)(holding that where he had notified all counsel that the clerk had
been removed from case, the "judge did everything he could to preserve the im-
partiality of the court, both in fact and appearance"); Hunt v. American Bank &
Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir. 1986)(finding recusal unnecessary where
the judge removed the file from the clerk once the clerk accepted a job with a
party's law firm); Reddy v. Jones, 419 F. Supp. 1391,1391 (W.D.N.C. 1976)(holding
that recusal was not required when the clerk was taken off case).
115. Hall v. Small Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175,179 (5th Cir. 1983); Miller Indus., Inc.
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp. 84,89 (S.D. Ala. 1980). However, denial of
the recusal motion was upheld in Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1472
(11th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987), where the clerk continued
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After law clerks leave the employ of the judge, they generally may
appear before the judge for whom they clerked. To prohibit a former
law clerk from ever appearing "would cast an undue burden on the
law clerk,"116 both as to the clerk's willingness to take the job as well
as the clerk's ability to find employment after completing a term for
the judge.117 Later appearances as counsel in cases in which the clerk
was involved while with the judge are prohibited, but generally courts
permit appearances in other cases. An example of the former circum-
stance occurred in Fredonia Broadcasting Corp., Inc. v. RCA Corp.,1 8
where the former law clerk had worked on the case in question when
it was first tried on the merits. After trial on the merits, the clerk
accepted employment with counsel for one of the parties, began work-
ing on the case as an attorney, and actively participated in the retrial
of the matter. The appellate court held that the trial judge should
have recused himself: 1) because of the possibility that the former
clerk's client might have an unfair advantage as a result of the former
association with the judge and 2) out of concern for the "purity of the
judicial process and its institutions."119
Without regard to the time lapse between the end of the clerk's
term and the former clerk's appearance before the judge, federal
courts have denied recusal motions when a former clerk appears
before the judge in any case the clerk did not work on for the judge.120
The decisions note, however, that judges should seriously consider
working on a case after being hired by counsel in the case. The case had been
before the judge for years, the judge had formed his conclusion about the merits
before hiring the clerk, and the judge had granted the motion for summary judg-
ment orally, leaving to the clerk only the work on the written opinion. See also
Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 33 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that recusal was unneces-
sary when the law clerk continued to work on a case after accepting a job with a
law firm which previously had represented a party in the case but was not repre-
senting that party in the case at bar).
116. Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
117. See Smith v. Pepsico, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 524, 526 (S.D. Fla. 1977):
[S]ome judges ... employ law clerks with the specific expectation that
the clerks will remain in that city or area to practice law. If a court were
to accept the contention that recusal was necessary whenever counsel
had been a prior law clerk to a judge, this would be an unfair penalty
placed upon former law clerks of Federal Judges.
118. 569 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
119. Id. at 256 (quoting Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 403 F.2d
437, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971)).
120. See, e.g., Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1372 (8th Cir. 1985)(clerk appeared
before judge nine months after completing clerkship); United States v. Hollister,
746 F.2d 420, 425-26 (8th Cir. 1984)(clerk appeared three months later); Cheeves
v. Southern Clays, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1579, 1581-82 (M.D. Ga. 1990)(clerk appeared
three years later); Smith v. Pepsico, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 524, 525-26 (S.D. Fla.
1977)(clerk appeared two years later).
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recusal when a recent law clerk appears as counsel before the judge.' 2 '
While no bright line rule exists in the decisions, several circuits, by
rule, prescribe a one or two-year limitation period.1 22
Judges simply act differently when a former law clerk appears in
the judge's court, regardless of the nature of the relationship between
the judge and the former clerk. The failure of a judge to withdraw
when a recent law clerk appears in the judge's court is dramatized in
United States v. Bosch, 2 3 where the majority upheld the trial court's
denial of the recusal motion. The importance of the case lies not so
much in what the judge said about his former law clerk, but that the
judge allowed himself to say anything - to go beyond appearances, to
let his guard down, and to express what many judges probably feel
about former clerks and other employees. On several occasions, the
trial judge specifically referred to the former law clerk who was now a
federal prosecutor. First, following the grant of an extension of time
to the prosecutor, the judge referred to the former clerk and stated,
"And just out of humanitarian milk of kindness I want to make things
easier for him, if that's possible." The dissenting judge remarked:
On its face, this comment demonstrates the judge's strong affection and close
friendship with the prosecuting attorney. It also demonstrates that the judge
had feelings of sympathy for [the prosecutor] and a desire "to make things
easier for him" - a desire based on considerations neither relevant nor related
to Bosch's trial.
1 2 4
Second, during arguments for a new trial, the judge said about the
former clerk, "I think as a good father would - and I feel like that
about him - looked at his performance with a particularly jaundiced
eye." Again, the dissenting judge observed:
Here, the trial judge states that his affection and admiration for the young
prosecutor amounted to the special feelings of a father for his son. The state-
ment contradicts what it attempts to prove: that the judge can treat [the pros-
ecutor] as he would any other attorney who might appear before him. We
cannot treat our children as strangers, no matter how we might try. Although
the judge's affection for [the prosecutor] may not in fact have been as strong as
the parent-child bond, or as difficult to disregard, I reluctantly conclude that
the statement created an appearance of bias.
12 5
Later in the same hearing, in response to allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct, the judge said, "But I would be very critical of him, as I
would have, as I say, one of my sons." The dissenting judge observed:
Again, this comment appears to deny what it purports to prove: that the judge
had a normal, professional relationship with the prosecutor that allowed him
to judge that attorney's conduct with the same eyes with which he would
121. Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1372 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hollister,
746 F.2d 420, 426 (8th Cir. 1984).
122. See, e.g., 1sT Cm. R. 46 (one year); 8TH CiR. R. 47G (one year). See also SuP. CT.
P 7 (two years).
123. 951 F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 2975 (1992).
124. 1d at 1553 (O'Sclannlain, J., dissenting).
125. IA
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judge any other attorney's conduct. The judge's statements would give a rea-
sonable observer cause to believe that the judge shared an extraordinarily
close friendship with the prosecutor, who had served as his law clerk only two
years before the commencement of Bosch's trial.12 6
Section 455(b) should be amended with a "bright-line" standard re-
quiring recusal on the basis of a law clerk's participation or conduct.
First, former law clerks are in a situation factually comparable to a
judge's relatives, whose presence in the judge's court as a party, coun-
sel, witness or possessor of an interest in the proceeding requires the
judge's recusal. Judicial recusal is mandated not because all judges
love and will favor all of their relatives. Rather, the practice of presid-
ing over a case in which close relatives are involved threatens the in-
tegrity of the judicial process. Likewise, the intense professional
relationships between judges and their clerks support a definite, pre-
dictably applied criterion for conduct. Moreover, with close relatives,
the judge is disqualified not as a result of any personal fault, but sim-
ply as a result of the "fortuity" of the relative's presence in the judge's
court. The same predicament is true for law clerks. While working
for a federal judge, they may work on cases where their future em-
ployer is counsel for a party or, following their clerkship, they may
soon appear in the judge's court as a practicing attorney.
Second, a specific recusal standard relating to law clerk conduct or
appearance in a case is justified by judicial experience in dealing with
law clerk situations such as clerks appearing before the judge immedi-
ately after leaving the judge's employ or the clerk accepting a job with
a law firm which is counsel for a party in the judge's court. The start-
ing point in the evolution of legal standards is often a general legisla-
tive or common law maxim. Over time, judicial experience with a
group of cases produces a clear, specific common law principle which
the legislative branch can then use to declare a precise statutory stan-
dard which stands on its own or as a complement to an already ex-
isting general standard. The case law on law clerks suggests that a
definite recusal requirement for judges is ripe for consideration. Such
a statutory addition to § 455(b) would mandate recusal by a judge
when:
(6) The judge's law clerk:
(i) continues to work on a case where the clerk has accepted [or,
has received an offer of] a position of future employment and the
126. Id at 1554. Curiously, in previous remarks, the trial judge had referred to the
fact that the prosecutor had been his clerk "many years ago." Id. at 1553.
In Verela v. Jones, 746 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1984), one of the judge's former law
clerks appeared as trial counsel in a case while simultaneously handling the es-
tate of the judge's mother. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in
denying the recusal motion, because the client was the estate and the personal
representative, rather than the judge, selected counsel. Id at 1417.
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clerk's future employer [or, the offeror] is a party or attorney for a
party in a case assigned to the judge; or
(ii) is the attorney of record or appears as a practicing attorney in
a case assigned to the judge within - year(s) after terminating
employment with the judge.
III. CONCLUSION
28 U.S.C. § 455(b) describes the specific circumstances in which a
judge can be disqualified sua sponte or by motion of one of the parties
for a proscribed conflict of interest. This Article has noted specific
ways in which trial and appellate courts have interpreted or applied
the statute beyond its terms. The common law of judicial disqualifica-
tion which has developed indicates the difficulty in drafting a statute
which addresses every specific situation that might arise. Such an
evolution should invite periodic statutory modification to reflect legal
developments in the areas already addressed by specific sections and
to add new fact patterns to the specific grounds for judicial
disqualification.
